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Abstract
As scientific progress approaches the point where significant human enhancements could become reality, debates arise whether
such technologies should be made available. This paper evaluates the widespread concern that human enhancements will
inevitably accentuate existing inequality and analyzes whether prohibition is the optimal public policy to avoid this outcome.
Beyond these empirical questions, this paper considers whether the inequality objection is a sound argument against the set of
enhancements most threatening to equality, i.e., cognitive enhancements. In doing so, I shall argue that cognitive enhancements
can be embraced wholeheartedly, for three separate reasons. However, though the inequality objection does not sufficiently
support the conclusion that cognitive enhancements should be prohibited, it raises several concerns for optimal policy design that
shall be addressed here.
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Introduction
Self-improvement has been of philosophical interest since the
ancient Greek philosophers. New technologies, however,
might fundamentally alter our understanding of what it means
to Bimprove.^ Furthermore, new ethical challenges present
themselves that need to be answered. Eugenics has been the
subject of diverse dystopian science-fiction novels and
movies, from Brave New World to Gattaca and more recently
Star Trek. They mostly depict a bleak future of humanity in
which genetic determinism is taken to its extreme.
Nevertheless, genetic engineering is not the only way humans
could enhance themselves or others in the future.
Enhancements through chemical means such as drugs or tech-
nologies such as computer chips in the brain are also the sub-
ject of many futuristic fiction settings. However, these settings
are not mere fictions, and could be much sooner realized than
anticipated. In the case of many drugs such as modafinil or
less obvious coffee, we are already faced with the question
whether to enhance or not. Scientific progress has reached a
point, where a serious engagement with the philosophical is-
sues at stake has become unavoidable.
In this paper, I critically examine the claim that human
enhancement will inevitably accentuate existing inequality1
and analyze whether prohibition is the optimal public policy
for this objection as various sorts of egalitarians might, there-
fore, advise.2 Naturally, various moral theories will evaluate
this claim, which I shall call the inequality objection (IO),
differently. Yet, for the purposes of the present paper, I shall
consider the ethical concerns of the IO in a way that is non-
committal to any of the main moral theories, but may never-
theless be treated as relevant to policy evaluation, e.g., un-
equal access or an increase in criminal activity. An expanded
abstract of an early version of this paper concerned more nar-
rowly with utilitarianism and well-being is forthcoming in
the Proceedings of the IX Congress of the Spanish Society for
Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science (forthcoming;
2018). Of course, very strong versions of egalitarianismmay be
immune to the criticism to the objections I present in this paper.
However, such an immunity may then be considered as a lia-
bility of strong egalitarianism.
The question then becomes whether enhancement poses a
threat to society. This threat is a deliberately vague notion, as
1 Various authors such as Mehlman and Botkin (1998) raised the inequality
objection. Though they only focused on unequal access to genomic testing, I
extend the concern to all cognitive enhancements.
2 Lamont, Julian and Favor, Christi, BDistributive Justice^, The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),
Accessed on June 19, 2018: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/
entries/justice-distributive
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this paper aims to explore a variety of concerns the inequality
objection raises. However, in what follows, I argue that the IO
has several problems. In light of these, I argue that cognitive
enhancements can be embraced wholeheartedly, for three sep-
arate reasons. First, there is no empirical evidence that cogni-
tive enhancement will lead tomore inequality; rather, I argue it
has the potential to decrease it. Second, even if we accept that
human enhancement will lead to inequality, it is not clear
whether this will outweigh the potential benefits of human
enhancement. Third, even if enhancement technologies do
accentuate existing inequalities and have a negative impact
on society, a strict egalitarian solution, i.e., outright prohibi-
tion of enhancement, may be worse than other kinds of policy
responses. Therefore, the claim that human enhancement
leads to inequality does not sufficiently support the conclusion
that cognitive enhancements should be prohibited by policy
makers. Nevertheless, the inequality objection raises several
concerns for optimal policy design that shall be addressed in
this paper.3
My criticism is structured as follows: In the BWhat Is at
Stake?^ section, I attempt to bring the IO into formal argu-
ment structure and clarify terms that are unclear. In the
BHuman Enhancement leads to Inequality?^ section, I attack
the claim that cognitive enhancements lead to inequality. In
the BInequality Leads to a Negative Social Outcomes?^ sec-
tion, I analyze how inequalities in access to enhancements
could negatively impact society and argue that such an impact
is outweighed by the positive effects of enhancements. In the
BProhibition of Human Enhancement, the Best Solution?^
section, I argue that even if the IO is right and a decrease in
well-being is unavoidable, prohibition is unlikely to be the
best possible policy response in order to maximize well-being.
Lastly, in , I summarize my criticism and conclude that the IO
does not sufficiently support the conclusion that human en-
hancement should be prohibited by policy makers.
What Is at Stake?
Though perhaps having raised the largest concerns in the pub-
lic perception of human enhancement, the IO is neither a very
sophisticated argument nor a genuinely new one against the
introduction of new technologies that could enhance humans
beyond what might be considered Bnormal.^ In the following,
I am going to show that the whole argument is just old wine in
new bottles. Concerning inequality, Bostrom and Roache
claim that one could hold the prima facie justified worry that:
B…people with radically enhanced cognitive capaci-
ties might gain vast advantages in terms of income,
strategic planning, and the ability to influence
others; in other words, an enhanced cognitive elite
may gain socially significant amounts of power.^
(Bostrom and Roach 2007: p.15)
Interestingly, Bostrom and Roache restrict themselves to cog-
nitive enhancements, suggesting that other enhancements
might be less problematic or rather domain-specific, such as
ethical discussions of doping in sports. Hence, I will restrict
the following discussion to cognitive enhancements, which
seems to be the more problematic subset of enhancements
providing a competitive advantage more severe than other
sorts of enhancement. If cognitive enhancements are unprob-
lematic, then by extension, human enhancement, in general,
should not face much opposition. Of course, the idea of an
enhanced elite accumulating a lot of power and creating a two-
class society seems intuitive and rather unappealing. But
whether this is even a plausible scenario is an open question.
Rather than considering whether such extreme cases are likely,
I focus instead on inequality in general, i.e., evaluate the var-
ious scenarios in which increases in inequality can have a
negative impact on society. From this broad perspective, the
IO can be formulated formally as follow:
P1: Human enhancement accentuates existing inequalities.
P2: Inequality has a negative impact on society.
P3: New technologies that have a negative impact on
society should be prohibited by policy makers.
C: Therefore, human enhancement should be prohibited
by policy makers.
As I shall show in my three-horned attack, this argument
has major flaws. Though I am sure opponents of enhance-
ments will find this restructuring of their worries exceedingly
oversimplified, this argument should enable both critics and
proponents of enhancements to see where their substantial
disagreement lies.
Hence, in order to attack the IO in a more precise and clear
manner, let me first clarify how I am going to use three crucial
terms from the debate, i.e., human enhancement, inequality,
and negative impact. First, I deviate from the Borthodox^ def-
inition of human enhancement provided by Bostrom and
Roache, who define human enhancement as interventions that
B[…] aim to improve the state of an organism beyond its
normal healthy state^ (2007: p.1). This definition of enhance-
ment faces several problems. What a normal healthy state is,
has plagued philosophy of medicine since its very conception.
In the following, I will use a definition of enhancement that
avoids employing the concept of normality. This is in contrast
to Lin and Allhoff (2008) who criticize a pro-enhancement
stance on functional rather than human enhancements.
3 Due to limited space, I shall restrict myself here to discussing optimal policy
design in the Western nations. As a reviewer pointed out, different cultures
may require very different policy responses to enhancement technologies.
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In a previous article on genetic enhancement, I suggested
that much disagreement between proponents and critics of
human enhancement can be resolved, by recognizing that
most proponents of enhancement technologies such as
Savulescu et al. (2011) simply do not accept the orthodox view
of what enhancements are (2018: p. 76). They draw an impor-
tant distinction between B[f]unctional enhancement, the en-
hancement of some capacity or power (e.g. vision, intelligence,
health) and human enhancement, the enhancement of a human
being’s life^ (2011: p. 3). Human enhancement is then defined
as B[a]ny change in the biology or psychology of a person
which increases the chances of leading a good life in the rele-
vant set of circumstances^ (2011: p. 7). The latter is the defini-
tion relevant for the argument in this paper. Cognitive enhance-
ments are most often associated with the increase of a cognitive
capacity, irrespective of whether this increased the likelihood of
leading a better life. That is not the form of cognitive enhance-
ments I defend here. I argue that if a cognitive enhancement
qualifies as a human enhancement given the normative defini-
tion by Savulescu et al. (2011), the IO is insufficient to warrant
prohibition. Whether something qualifies as an enhancement is
then the important issue at stake.
However, in shifting our focus from functional to human
enhancement, critics might respond that we have opened up
ourselves to a much more severe criticism. Now, rather than
dealing with the problem of defining normal functioning, they
could insist that trying to give an account of a good life is a much
bigger problem. I agree; hence, I shall remain uncommitted to
any particular view of the good life and employ Savulescu’s
strategy of defining all-purpose goods that would qualify as en-
hancements under all major accounts of the good life:
BI have not committed myself to any particular substan-
tive conception of the good life. That is a complex ques-
tion as old as philosophy itself. I believe the best life is a
life of objectively worthwhile activity that provides plea-
sure and is desired.^ [2007; p. 286].
Without committing myself to a particular view, I follow
Julian Savulescu’s (2007) suggestion of all-purpose means that
would qualify under all major accounts of what makes a life go
better, i.e., hedonism, preference-satisfaction, and objective list
theories. This enables us to avoid one of the oldest debates in
philosophy and focus on the ethical implications of various cog-
nitive enhancements. He suggests several cognitive enhance-
ments that could satisfy his criteria such as B[m]emory, self-dis-
cipline, impulse control, foresight, patience, sense of fairness,
honesty^ (2007, p. 284). Notably, some notion of general intel-
ligence or computational power is missing here and for good
reason. The idea is that an improvement beyond a certain point,
rather than going beyond what is considered normal, can have
negative effects on the well-being of the altered. Think of people
who have nomemory filter and remember any unnecessary detail
of their lives and the higher rates of depression among scholars.
Though research has not established sufficient links between
higher intelligence and unhappiness, one should be wary of the
fact that for increased abilities, theremight be a tradeoff of certain
other capacities. Whatever goes beyond the point of making a
human life expected to be better should simply not be considered
as a human enhancement that is expected to improve a life
(2018).
Opponents might respond that the set of proponents of en-
hancement are trying to defend, i.e., mostly future technologies
would then just be empty given our insufficient knowledge in
how they will affect the lives of agents. However, the welfarist
definition of enhancement already covers almost all medical
treatments as a subset of enhancements as they are expected to
improve the life of the recipients. In an earlier paper I argued that
B[a]ccording to this welfarist definition, a conception of normal-
ity is not needed to define enhancement as we do not define an
enhancement as being better than normal, but simply being better
full stop^ (2018: p. 77). This also enables us to draw a useful
distinction between interventions and enhancements, terms that
are often used interchangeably, with enhancements being inter-
ventions expected to improve the life of the recipient.
Though the notion of normality has perhaps guided thinking
in the biomedical sciences, since the very beginning, the danger
of such thinking becomes clear, once it is recognized that it
served as the very basis of discrimination against minorities,
such as the LGTBQ community or the disabled. Deviation from
what is considered Bnormal^ should not be seen as a moral vice,
but even those who oppose the discrimination of minorities use
the very same moral concept to argue for a distinction between
medical treatments and enhancements. Surely, no one taking the
IO seriously would argue that we should prevent the develop-
ments and use new medical treatments, just because this might
lead to an increase in inequality, with only richest being able to
afford new treatments. New experimental treatments might be
prohibitively expensive but become available to all with further
medical advancements. However, by defining medical treat-
ments as a subset of enhancements, the burden of proof is shifted
to those who oppose enhancements. The proponent flat-out de-
nies amoral difference between treating someone and enhancing
the life of someone. What the IO illustrates, however, is that
there might be better policies reaping the benefits of enhance-
ments while making them available or affordable to everyone.
Let me postpone this issue to the BProhibition of Human
Enhancement, the Best Solution?^ section. The notion defended
here then are human enhancements expected to improve the
lives of those receiving them. However, the term cognitive en-
hancement is tightly tied to the conception of functional en-
hancements such as an increase of a particular cognitive capac-
ity, e.g., memory and alertness. To ease avoidable disagreement
within, the debate proponents of enhancements should clarify
that they are specifically interested in cognitive enhancements
that qualify as human enhancements, while opponents of such
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technologies might realize substantial agreement once this qual-
ification is recognized. Nevertheless, when individuals enhance
themselves or other individuals, there might be unforeseen neg-
ative consequences for the society.With this inmind, let me now
to turn to P1 and examine whether human enhancements lead to
inequality.
Human Enhancement Leads to Inequality?
Each of the following sections will be focused on one of the
premises. Let me begin with the claim that human enhancement
will increase inequality. This premise is empirical in nature and
as such requires supporting evidence. While it is unclear what
evidence for the adequacy of this premise has been provided,
there is at least some evidence that seems to speak against it.
More specifically, there are reasons to believe that human en-
hancement will not affect inequality at all, or even decrease it as
Bostrom and Roach (2007: p. 16) suggest by making people
Bmore equal^ like it is the case with modafinil (Randall et al.
2005). Modafinil is a drug used to treat narcolepsy and disor-
ders causing sleepiness. Modafinil helps people to stay awake
and focused, with a similar effect to that of caffeine. Just like
coffee is used as a cognitive enhancer, people not suffering from
any of the aforementioned disorders started using modafinil to
reap similar benefits. The effects Bostrom and Roache (2007: p.
16) argue have a diminishing effect on those already possessing
higher cognitive capacities, and can even lead to the opposite
effect in those who already possess much higher intelligence
than the average. If everyone had access to modafinil, it seems
likely then that the result would be more rather than less equal-
ity as suggested by Bostrom and Roache (2007: p. 16). A sub-
stantial division between the unenhanced and enhanced seems
then unlikely.
Furthermore, Bostrom suggests that we know far more about
genes responsible for inheritable diseases than genes responsible
for talents, intelligence, and longevity; hence, genetic enhance-
ment might especially help the genetically worse off in the soci-
ety (2003: p.18). As I argued in a previous publication (2018, p.
12), at least when it comes to genetic enhancements, we can
expect them to get rid of a major source of inequality, i.e., the
elimination of the natural lottery which would then truly provide
more equal opportunities. The IO is then actually an objection
against unequal access to these technologies due to existing in-
equity. Limited access or unavailability of such technologies for
those who are already worse off may widen the gap between the
rich and the poor even further. Many cognitive enhancements,
however, in fact the majority, are freely available. Malinowski
and Shalamanova (2017) argue that research into meditation has
shown that many cognitive capacities can be enhanced by med-
itation practices and even halt the effect of aging on the brain.
These forms of cognitive enhancement seem to be entirely
unproblematic. Critics of other forms of enhancement might
want to defend a moral distinction between natural and
artificial means. After all, they are not opposed to such forms
of enhancements nor following a healthy diet that increases
cognitive capacities; instead, they attempt to carve out a
definition of enhancement excluding those we deem acceptable
making use of the enhancement concept solely for the purpose of
drawing a limit to the aims of medicine. I do not think such a
distinction can be provided for reasons going back as far as those
provided by J.S. Mill (1874) who argued against the common
idea to equate the good with the natural. After all, what is so
natural about using a wheelchair or swallowing medicine against
a headache?
However, there are other kinds of cognitive enhancements
that might be prohibitively expensive, e.g., computer chips in
human brains to increase cognitive capacities or increase the
release of dopamine and oxytocin. The same would hold for
expensive drugs with similar effects. What we have to be con-
cerned with is the plausibility of the IO. Erik Parens claims that
BThose who already have economic resources will readily gain
access to new technologies and those new technologies will
make them stronger competitors for more resources^ (1998:
S8). If Parens’ claim is to hold, then an implicit premise needs
to be true, i.e., enhancements of say cognitive capacities must
be good investments. Surely, enhanced cognitive abilities could
help you in the market. But that does not mean they are good
investments. Owning the most recent sports car would certainly
help you to transport pizza from place A to B faster, but that
does not mean it would be a good investment for a pizza place
that could hire a significant amount of additional workers in-
stead. For this worry to hold, we need to consider cognitive
enhancements that might enable agents to become more com-
petitive. If they are investments worthmaking, it seems unlikely
that people would not consider taking loans for self-enhance-
ment, in order to increase their expected wage. Banks might
even hand out loans for cognitive enhancements in a similar
fashion to education loans. After all, if there is an expected
monetary payoff, then a market will be created. However, one
potential worry is that when everyone is Bforced^ to enhance in
order to stay competitive; inequality in the society will increase
while competitiveness remains the same. This precludes the
possibility that a society where everyone is enhanced can have
positive social outcomes such as higher wealth and productiv-
ity. Let me defer this discussion until BInequality Leads to a
Negative social Outcomes?^ section where I discuss positive
and negative social outcomes. The enhancements equal out, as
everyone is enhanced. Instead of paying for advanced training
courses, employers might even consider paying for cognitive
enhancements of their employees. Just like many companies
offer coffee for free for their employees, they might provide
free access to modafinil, a cognitive enhancer that is fairly
cheap. Though I deem these markets to be problematic, after
all, education loans are hardly uncontested; I argue that there is
no substantial difference between current policies against the
accentuation of inequality in accepted cognitive enhancements
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and the future treatment of enhancement technologies. Hence,
they should be treated equally. After all, when one considers
education a form of cognitive enhancement, similar concerns
arise. Children from a better socio-economic background do
receive better education, benefits which can accrue over time.
Affirmative action is widely accepted as an intervention to pre-
vent these inequalities to become larger and larger. This gives
us reason to believe that similar solutions are available in the
case of enhancement technologies. Let me postpone this dis-
cussion until BProhibition of Human Enhancement, the Best
Solution?^ section.
A systematic review of Battleday and Brem (2015) in healthy
individuals suggests that attention, learning, and memory can be
improved by taking modafinil without any negative effects, with
long-term effects to be determined. Smart drugs such as
modafinil are used among students, faculty, and people in the
economy, especially highly competitive jobs such as trading (see
Fronda et al. 2018). As many people believe the usage of smart
drugs to provide an unfair advantage, perhaps even count as
cheating, the number of actual users might be even higher than
what surveys suggest. In fact, drinking good coffee over a whole
day is hardly more expensive then taking a pill of modafinil.
However, why then is drinking coffee morally unproblematic?
Whether employers will provide their employees with cognitive
enhancements such as modafinil is, of course, an open question,
as the profitability and risks of most cognitive enhancements are
currently unknown and still under research. However, once we
reach the point tomake confident statements on the expected life-
improving capacity of cognitive enhancements, all the alternative
scenarios just suggested seem, if not more than, at least as likely
as the scenario of a divided society ruled by a cognitively en-
hanced elite. Even so, let us grant for the moment that the above
worries arewellmotivated, and the poorwill not be able to access
cognitive enhancements themselves. In what follows, I consider
premise (2) and question whether inequality will really lead to a
negative social outcomes.
Inequality Leads to a Negative Social Outcomes?
According to egalitarians, everyone should be equal. The con-
ception of this equality might differ, e.g., economic equality,
equality in well-being, and equality of opportunity (Arneson
2013). Inequalities of all sorts have long been defended on
grounds that they improve the overall well-being or improve
the lives of those who are worse off. What matters, for en-
hancement advocates, such as Savulescu et al. (2011), is how
different kinds of inequality have the potential to negatively
impact society. Several reasons could come to mind: potential
oppression, discrimination, unfairness, exploitation, envy, or
simply a preference for equality (Mehlman and Botkin 1998).
Even if we grant that these are worrisome consequences of
cognitive enhancements, we would still have to weigh the
benefits against these costs. Proponents of prohibition often
referred to as bioconservatives (Bostrom and Roach 2007)
seem to either ignore the benefits of human enhancement or
implicitly think that they are far outweighed by the costs. To
make their claim as strong as possible, I will give them the
benefit of the doubt and tackle the latter. While we may grant
that cognitive enhancement might decrease overall well-being
by introducing inequality, there are other areas where human
enhancement can potentially increase well-being enormously
and outweigh losses through inequality.
Even if only one cognitively enhanced scientist discovers a
new cure to a disease, the effects on well-being would be
substantial. Even minor increases in productivity, say 10%,
in the workforce could have substantive positive effects in
the long-run. Since the industrial revolution, standard of living
has improved to a level people could not have anticipated.
This is largely due to the availability of new technologies for
solving old problems ever more efficiently. Furthermore, I
deem it unlikely that someone would be opposed to surgeons
taking cognitive enhancers to increase their ability to concen-
trate during a complicated procedure, just because they would
gain a competitive advantage over their peers. The value of
saving lives outweighs the negative effects of peer pressure to
take enhancers. Competition drives innovation and technolog-
ical progress, and the availability of cognitive enhancers will
only accelerate this process. However, these innovations may
vastly improve the lives of others; after all, in most profes-
sions, competitiveness is not a mere zero-sum game.
The worry of oppression and discrimination would require
being able to determine who is enhanced and who is not,
which is impossible with most cognitive enhancements.
Unless you would have an enormous scar on your head where
a computer chip might have been implemented and people
who do not have such scars are discriminated against, the
worry rests on the discrimination of those who are less well
off. When advantages in society are based on access to cog-
nitive enhancements, rather than claims such as effort and
skill, the argument for redistribution seems to be strong, while
an account of Desert for those born rich enough to pay for
enhancements seems incredibly weak. As argued in my paper
Procreative Beneficence and Genetic Enhancement (2018),
there could be potential solutions to keep the benefits of hu-
man enhancement while limiting the costs of inequality, most
obviously state-funding. Therefore, what I analyze next is the
possible solution of prohibition and how it compares to other
alternatives.
Prohibition of Human Enhancement, the Best
Solution?
Even if we accept that human enhancement has the potential to
increase inequality in the society and the costs they put on soci-
ety outweigh the potential benefits, the question arises whether a
prohibition is actually the best policy toweigh these against each
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other. What we shall be concerned with are the consequences of
this prohibition. I argue that it is wrong to think that we have the
choice between status quo and a world where human enhance-
ment takes place. The mere availability of one additional option
alone can change the whole situation. In the economic domain,
one can often observe seemingly irrational preferences. Suppose
a customer looks at the menu of a restaurant and orders salmon
rather than a steak. However, the waiter then suggests a burger
with fries as an alternative that is not on the menu. The customer
then replies: BNo thanks, but I’ll take the steak now.^4 This
example seems irrational, but one explanation could be that a
restaurant selling burgers has the risk of selling low-quality fish,
hence, revealing new information. A well-done steak, on the
other hand, might then seem like a safe bet. The availability of
other options can drastically change a situation, even if prohibi-
tions are in place. One only has to look at the prohibition of
alcohol in the USA. Even though a world without alcohol might
be better, prohibition might lead to a much worse state of the
world with high rates of illegal activity. Applied to human en-
hancement, it is easy to see that a world where it is illegal does
not equal a world where this technology is not available. Illegal
provision of cognitive enhancers in black markets is just as
possible as the provision of alcohol during the Prohibition.
The same applies to common debates in relation to doping, drug
abuse, weapons, etc. The liberal argument against the prohibi-
tion of different sorts’ points out that even if a technology or
practice is considered detrimental to the well-being of the pop-
ulation, the consequences of prohibition might be even worse.
Not muchmore of an argument is needed to point out the failure
of the war on drugs in the USA (see Baum 1996). In the follow-
ing, I am going to argue that the same applies to cognitive
enhancements. Let us take a look at several problems suggested
in the literature, which need to be considered:
First, Bostrom and Roache highlight that a legal prohi-
bition of human enhancement requires distinguishing cur-
rent practices of medicine from enhancements, which cre-
ates several problems (2007: p.1–3). Proponents of human
enhancements as interventions that improve well-being do
not have to deal with this arguably arbitrary distinction.
When cognitive enhancements like meditation and coffee
are legal, but modafinil should be illegal, a distinction
would have to be drawn. A distinction perhaps is unjusti-
fiable, similar to the legal status of alcohol compared to
marijuana. Second, the prohibition would have to be glob-
ally enforced; otherwise, one could still access these tech-
nologies at least somewhat legally (Heller and Peterson
2006). Permanent alterations to the human body are hardly
detectable nor is there any suggestion how perpetrators
should be punished. Would they be forced to undergo brain
surgery? What about genetically enhanced embryos that
develop into highly intelligent children? Detection and
punishment in all of these cases will lead to heated debates
even among those advocating a ban on such practices.
Third, Anders Sandberg and Nick Bostrom claim that a
prohibition will be an incentive for the creation of black
markets, which as with drugs may tend to make these tech-
nologies even more expensive, while legal enhancements
would become less risky and less expensive as time goes
on (2009: p. 333). Not only would a ban make cognitive
enhancements more expensive, it could even lead to more
inequality than a free market in cognitive enhancements.
Fourth, Mehlman and Botkin (1998: chapter 7) raise the
question of how those breaking the law should be
punished; for instance, will someone with genetic enhance-
ments be forced to alter his DNA back to the point it was
before or have to be sterilized? Will people who would
have died without enhancements have to be sentenced to
death by revoking their enhancements? These issues are
not easily avoidable for legislators when effective prohibi-
tion is being implemented.
So even if the claim is correct that human enhancement will
lead to inequality, the proposed solution of prohibition seems to
face severe problems that proponents of prohibition are invited
to address. In short, there are several reasons speaking against
prohibition and some that speak in favor of other solutions. Let
me shortly expand on them. For instance, Nick Bostrom (2003:
p.17) proposes subsidies or free access for poor families. I agree
with Lamont and Favor (2014: section 6) that the middle
ground between open market access and prohibition needs to
be considered. As such, it seems that prohibition is not the best
policy against the potential risks of inequality. Prohibition is
likely to turn out to be worse than many other kinds of regula-
tion that addresses at least some of the legitimate concerns that
proponents of the IO have brought forward.
Conclusion
In conclusion, there seem to be at least three major problems
with the inequality objection against cognitive enhancements.
Firstly, there is no actual empirical evidence that the availabil-
ity of cognitive enhancements will lead to inequality. There
are several reasons to suggest that cognitive enhancements
might actually decrease inequality by leveling the playing
field. Second, even if we accept that human enhancement will
lead to some sort of inequality, it is not clear whether this will
outweigh the potential benefits of cognitive enhancements.
Even when one assumes a free market without subsidies for
such technologies, employers and financial institutes should
be happy to support workers in their quest to enhance them-
selves if it is, in fact, the case that this leads to gains in effi-
ciency. Third, even if the effects on well-being in the society
through inequality are substantial, prohibition is very unlikely
4 I recall a similar example given in one of my economics courses on irrational
preferences as an undergraduate.
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to be the best policy for maximization of well-being. This is
because it is, for instance, plausible to assume that, given that
human enhancement is possible and distributed via black mar-
kets, there are several plausible ways in which this will affect
overall well-being negatively. In light of these concerns, I
conclude that even if human enhancement leads to inequality,
this is not sufficient to conclude that human enhancement
should be prohibited by policy makers. However, this is not
to say there might be other arguments than the inequality
objection which could warrant prohibition.
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